The ethics of psychiatry The ethics of psychiatry is one of the areas of medical ethics where the overlap between medical ethics and philosophy of medicine is largest. This is illustrated by two papers in the current issue of the JME. Charlotte Blease discusses whether it is “… ever right to prescribe placebos to patients in clinical practice?” in the context of prescribing for patients with severe depression . Would such prescriptions for instance amount to morally problematic deception? In an (...) intricate analysis she points out that the answer to the question depends on a range of complex conceptual distinctions that will be familiar to scholars in philosophy of medicine. One very significant issue that is raised is that well-being is not synonymous with a realistic assessment of oneself or one's circumstances. Most of us who are not depressed have positive illusions about ourselves and this may even …. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

This anthology is intended primarily to provide students of theology with some of the basic writings of the major thinkers who have contributed to the development of the movement known as "process theology." Because of the content students of philosophy will likewise find it useful. The editor begins the work with an introduction in which he ably traces in broad perspective the various ways in which a mental attitude stressing process is reflected in contemporary culture, philosophy, and theology. The first (...) part of the volume then provides essays that center on process thought as this has emerged from the writings of Alfred North Whitehead and his American disciples. Two essays in this part are concerned with tracing the development of process thought, the one by Norman Pittenger centering on its historical evolution from Whitehead through Hartshorne and others into a distinct theological movement, whereas the one by Charles Hartshorne is concerned with the inner development of process thought as a noetic capable of dealing with relational reality. In other essays in this part Bernard Meland comments on the value of process thought in providing an imagery and concepts congenial to contemporary man in his struggle to understand his experience, and Bernard M. Loomer examines in detail the empirical basis and methodology central to Whitehead’s philosophy. The essays in the second part focus on the relationship between God and the world as this relationship is interpreted by process thinkers. Here selections include the final chapter of Whitehead’s Process and Reality, Hartshorne’s suggestive account of the philosophical and religious uses of the term "God," Schubert Ogden’s attempt to defend a concept of God modeled on process thought as more conformable to biblical testimony than the concept of God classical in Christian thought, Walter Stoke’s endeavor to integrate features of process thought within a more Thomistic framework relative to the being of God, and two essays by Daniel Day Williams and John B. Cobb, Jr. on the relationship between God and world and God and man. Essays in the third part, called "Christ and Redemption," reflect the efforts of three Whiteheadian-inspired theologians, Meland, Pittenger, and Henry Nelson Wieman, to rethink the Christian doctrine of the incarnation within the framework provided by process thought. In the fourth part of the work attention is directed from Whitehead to another major source of contemporary process theology, Teilhard de Chardin. The essays include Theodosius Dobzhansky’s lengthy critical appreciation of the major directions in Teilhard’s vision of the universe, Teilhard’s own views on a cosmic Christology, a development of his views on this topic by Henri de Lubac, and other studies of aspects of Teilhard’s thought by N. M. Wildiers, George Crespy, and Christopher F. Mooney. An appendix includes a comparative study of the metaphysics of Teilhard and Whitehead by Ian G. Barbour. A useful bibliography completes the anthology.—W. E. M. (shrink)

Some people have found my distinction between meaning and significance useful. In the following revision of that distinction, I hope to improve its accuracy and perhaps, therefore, its utility as well. My impulse for making the revision has been my realization, very gradually achieved, that meaning is not simply an affair of consciousness and unconsciousness. In 1967, in Validity in Interpretation, I roundly asserted that “there is no magic land of meanings outside human consciousness.” 1 That assertion would be true (...) if, godlike, we could oversee the whole of human consciousness, past, present, and future. But we language users, being limited creatures, intend our verbal meanings to go beyond what we can pay attention to at any moment. We intend our meanings to transcend our momentary limitations of attention and knowledge. Hence there is a land of meanings beyond past and present human consciousness—the land of the future. What I should have said originally is that there is no magic lance of meanings beyond the whole extent of human consciousness, past, present, and future. This correction of my original statements leads to a deepening of the concept of meaning.In 1960 I first proposed the analytical distinction between two aspects of textual interpretation. One of them, meaning, was fixed and immutable; the other, significance, was open to change.2 I acknowledged that significance, changeable or not, is the more valuable object of interpretation, because it typically embraces the present use of texts, and present use is present value. But I argued that, in academic criticism, the significance and use of a text ought to be rooted in its fixed meaning, since otherwise criticism would lack a stable object of inquiry and would merely float on tides of preference. The claim that one reader’s opinion is as valid as another’s would then be right, despite any indignant protest to the contrary. I did not wish to dissuade people from floating on the tides of preference if that was what they wished to do. I intended to provide a firm justification for those who wished to pursue historical scholarship. 3 I also assumed that even those who did not pursue historical scholarship might sometimes wish to exploit the possibility of historically fixed meaning. In my experience, even antiauthorial theorists sometimes with to regard their own texts as having a historically fixed meaning and will complain if someone misunderstands that meaning. 1. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, p. 4.2. See my “Objective Interpretation,” PMLA 75 : 463-79.3. See, for instance, W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, which ends:We submit that this is the true and objective way of criticism, as contrasted to what the very uncertainty of exegesis might tempt a second kind of critic to undertake: the way of biographical or genetic inquiry …. Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem “Prufrock”; it would not be a critical inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle. [P. 18] E. D. Hirsch, Jr., professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of numerous works, including Validity in Interpretation and The Aims of Interpretation. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Against Interpretation?”, “The Politics of Theories of Interpretation, and “Stylistics and Synonymity”. (shrink)

Psychologists' emerging interest in spirituality and religion as well as the relevance of each phenomenon to issues of psychological importance requires an understanding of the fundamental characteristics of each construct. On the basis of both historical considerations and a limited but growing empirical literature, we caution against viewing spirituality and religiousness as incompatible and suggest that the common tendency to polarize the terms simply as individual vs. institutional or ′good′ vs. ′bad′ is not fruitful for future research. Also cautioning against (...) the use of restrictive, narrow definitions or overly broad definitions that can rob either construct of its distinctive characteristics, we propose a set of criteria that recognizes the constructs' conceptual similarities and dissimilarities. Rather than trying to force new and likely unsuccessful definitions, we offer these criteria as benchmarks for judging the value of existing definitions. (shrink)

Material acquisition—buying, inheriting, being given—and nonmaterial—learning a word, assimilating a form—have been likened, and in both, meaningful acquisition cannot take place without a taxonomy, a scheme of categories into which the acquired element can be fitted. Then with these elements—both material and nonmaterial—we create a world or build and project a self, the painter and the interior decorator equally manipulating the elements in a vocabulary. The coarseness of such an outlook seems to bludgeon away long-established fine distinctions. We need not (...) deny, however, that there may be a kind of "indifference" in regard to "the real existence of the thing" which allows us "to play the part of judge in matters of taste," as Kant would have it,1 we need not deny the existence of an "aesthetic attitude: it is just that such indifference and such an attitude probably don't have much to do with our day-to-day experience of artifacts and perhaps needn't. The "aesthetic attitude" was not long ago defined by Jerome Stolnitz as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone."2 Stolnitz is at pains to distinguish the aesthetic attitude from "interests" with which it may be preferable to confuse it. "One of them," he writes, "is the interest in owning a work of art for the sake of pride or prestige". And again, "Another nonaesthetic interest is the 'cognitive,' i.e., the interest in gaining knowledge about an object". Both these interests sound rather acquisitive, and let us consider the "aesthetic attitude" as somehow tied in everyday practice to the bundle of "acquiring" activities. · 1. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith, p. 43.· 2. Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Criticism, excerpted in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, ed. John Hospers, p. 19; all further citations in text. Hiram W. Woodward, Jr. is a lecturer in the department of the history of art at the University of Michigan. He is editor of Eighty Works in the University of Michigan Museum of Art: A Handbook and coeditor of Barabudur: History and Significance of a Buddhist Monument. (shrink)

This is the first book to offer the best essays, articles, and speeches on ethics and intelligence that demonstrate the complex moral dilemmas in intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Some are recently declassified and never before published, and all are written by authors whose backgrounds are as varied as their insights, including Robert M. Gates, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; John P. Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social Thought at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown (...) University; and Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia and recipient of the Owens Award for contributions to the understanding of U.S. intelligence activities. Creating the foundation for the study of ethics and intelligence by filling in the gap between warfare and philosophy, this is a valuable collection of literature for building an ethical code that is not dependent on any specific agency, department, or country. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that Herbert Marcuse is "indispensable to the theory and practice of the New Left." The one-dimensional quality of contemporary everyday life is to be disrupted by a critical theory of society based upon the works of Karl Marx as interpreted and brought to bear upon the 20th Century. Hence, this collection of six New Left studies on Herbert Marcuse is called Critical Interruptions. The contributors are former students of Marcuse and all are younger than (...) thirty-five. The work is dedicated to Theodor W. Adorno and Ho Chi-Minh. The book is poorly edited; not only does the heavy Marcusean terminology make intelligibility slow; but poor rhetoric, grammar and punctuation also add to the slowness of the pace. The content of the essays, however, is uniformly very worthwhile and the book deserves a careful reading. The Marcuse Festschrift of 1967, edited by Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr., entitled The Critical Spirit, was a collection of essays "in honor of Herbert Marcuse." This 1970 book, Critical Interruptions, is addressed to the exposition, up-dating and critique of Marcuse himself. Therefore, this present work is of immediate help to all readers and students of Marcuse. Paul Breines, the editor, wrote the first essay, "From Guru to Spectre: Marcuse and the Implosion of the Movement"; this is a history of Marcuse's relation to the New Left over the past few years. The second essay, "Individuation as Praxis," by Shierry M. Weber, is an incisive and insightful critique of the New Left while studying the meaning of praxis, the personal dimensions of individuality and exploring realistic alternatives for a viable counter culture. "Reversals and Lost Meanings" by Russell Jacoby is a short attempt at dialectics. William Leiss' study, "The Critical Theory of Society: Present Situation and Future Tasks," is a fine review of the major representatives of the Frankfurt School of social philosophers. "On Sexuality and Politics in the Work of Herbert Marcuse" by John David Ober, explains the continuity and development in Marcuse's thought on sexuality from Eros and Civilization through One-Dimensional Man. Finally, the last essay, "One-Dimensionality: The Universal Semiotic of Technological Experience" by Jeremy J. Shapiro is an extended commentary on Marcuse's most recent thought as applied to the advancing technology of the age. The editor openly disclaims any inner unity to the six essays. The studies, however, reveal that at least these six students of Marcuse from the New Left understand the Master very well and are able to extend his thought successfully to key contemporary issues. At the end, there is a greater unity to the book than the editor anticipated.--E. W. R. (shrink)

A comunicação tem como propósito uma análise comparativa sobre o problema filosófico da arte como expressão de verdade, tendo em vista o idealismo platônico e o idealismo estético moderno de G.W.Hegel. Parte-se da hipótese que a presente análise sustenta uma relação paradoxal entre ambas propostas idealistas, na medida em que se em Platão é afirmada a tese da arte como distanciamento da verdade, considerando o seu caráter essencialmente mimético, em Hegel, a arte ao constituir-se como momento de realização efetiva do (...) Espírito só pode ser assim compreendida a partir do paradigma da ideia, de inspiração platônica. Ressalta-se a compreensão da arte oriunda da teoria metafísica platônica e de sua concepção idealista de aisthesis, bem como o caráter científico da estética, segundo Hegel, cuja fundamentação filosófica reivindica a compreensão da ideia, enquanto razão absoluta que se autodesdobra historicamente e se efetiva nos limites da finitude sensível. Pretende-se mostrar que a pretensa superação hegeliana da concepção idealista platônica acerca da arte não pode prescindir do fundamento do platonismo - a idéia universal, o infinito.: The Communication aims a comparative analysis on the philosophical problem of the art as an expression of truth, considering the Platonic idealism and the modern esthetic idealism from Hegel. The starting point is the assumption that this analysis holds a paradoxical relationship between both idealistic proposals, Insofar as Plato affirms the art thesis as detachment from the truth, considering his character essentially mimetic, Hegel says that the art to establish itself as a moment of effective realization from the Spirit can only be understood from the paradigm of the idea, of Platonic inspiration. We emphasize the art understanding coming from the Platonic metaphysics theory and his idealistic conception of aisthesis, as well as the scientific character of aesthetics, according to Hegel, whose philosophical foundation claims the understanding of the idea, as absolute reason that self unfolds historically carries up within the limits of finitude sensitive. It is intended to show that the Hegelian overcoming supposed from Platonic idealist conception about the art can not prescind from foundation of Platonism - the universal idea, the infinity. Keywords: Plato, Hegel, Idea, art, truth,idealism. (shrink)

Hartry Field has suggested that we should adopt at least a methodological deflationism: "[W]e should assume full-fledged deflationism as a working hypothesis. That way, if full-fledged deflationism should turn out to be inadequate, we will at least have a clearer sense than we now have of just where it is that inflationist assumptions... are needed". I argue here that we do not need to be methodological deflationists. More precisely, I argue that we have no need for a disquotational truth-predicate; that (...) the word 'true', in ordinary language, is not a disquotational truth-predicate; and that it is not at all clear that it is even possible to introduce a disquotational truth-predicate into ordinary language. If so, then we have no clear sense how it is even possible to be a methodological deflationist. My goal here is not to convince a committed deflationist to abandon his or her position. My goal, rather, is to argue, contrary to what many seem to think, that reflection on the apparently trivial character of T-sentences should not incline us to deflationism. (shrink)

Once God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible (...) to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation. (shrink)

A comunicação tem como propósito uma análise comparativa sobre o problema filosófico da arte como expressão de verdade, tendo em vista o idealismo platônico e o idealismo estético moderno de G.W.Hegel. Parte-se da hipótese que a presente análise sustenta uma relação paradoxal entre ambas propostas idealistas, na medida em que se em Platão é afirmada a tese da arte como distanciamento da verdade, considerando o seu caráter essencialmente mimético, em Hegel, a arte ao constituir-se como momento de realização efetiva do (...) Espírito só pode ser assim compreendida a partir do paradigma da ideia, de inspiração platônica. Ressalta-se a compreensão da arte oriunda da teoria metafísica platônica e de sua concepção idealista de aisthesis, bem como o caráter científico da estética, segundo Hegel, cuja fundamentação filosófica reivindica a compreensão da ideia, enquanto razão absoluta que se autodesdobra historicamente e se efetiva nos limites da finitude sensível. Pretende-se mostrar que a pretensa superação hegeliana da concepção idealista platônica acerca da arte não pode prescindir do fundamento do platonismo - a idéia universal, o infinito. (shrink)

Coping with uncertainty is a necessary part of ordinary life and is crucial to an understanding of how the mind works. For example, it is a vital element in developing artificial intelligence that will not be undermined by its own rigidities. There have been many approaches to the problem of uncertain inference, ranging from probability to inductive logic to nonmonotonic logic. Thisbook seeks to provide a clear exposition of these approaches within a unified framework. The principal market for the book (...) will be students and professionals in philosophy, computer science, and AI. Among the special features of the book are a chapter on evidential probability, which has not received a basic exposition before; chapters on nonmonotonic reasoning and theory replacement, matters rarely addressed in standard philosophical texts; and chapters on Mill's methods and statistical inference that cover material sorely lacking in the usual treatments of AI and computer science. (shrink)

The moral significance of preserving natural environments is not entirely an issue of rights and social utility, for a person’s attitude toward nature may be importantly connected with virtues or human excellences. The question is, “What sort of person would destroy the natural environment--or even see its value solely in cost/benefit terms?” The answer I suggest is that willingness to do so may well reveal the absence of traits which are a natural basis for a proper humility, self-acceptance, gratitude, and (...) appreciation of the good in others. (shrink)

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.